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The purpose of this study is to examine the link between audit committee characteristics 
and audit report lag among 288 companies listed at Bursa Malaysia for a three year period 
from 2007 to 2009. The characteristics of audit committee examined are audit committee 
independence, audit committee diligence and audit committee expertise. In this study, audit 
report lag refers to the number of days from the company’s year end (financial year) to the 
date of auditor’s report. The results of this study show that audit report lag for the listed 
companies in Malaysia ranges from 36 days to 184 days for the three year period. The 
results of this study also show that audit committee independence and audit committee 
expertise could assist in reducing audit report lag among companies in Malaysia. This study 
however could not provide any evidence on the link between audit committee diligence on 
audit report lag. Overall, the findings in this study provide some evidence supporting the 
resource based theory, whereby characteristics of the audit committee as the resources and 
capabilities could improve companies’ performance as well as corporate reporting. 
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1.  Introduction 
Financial reporting in general will provide useful information and assist users in decision making as 
capacity of capital providers in companies. Particularly users rely on the audited financial reports in 
their assessment and evaluation of companies’ performance. The audited financial reports will increase 
its reliability and users will feel affirm on the reports verified by the auditors and would be able to 
make decision wisely (FASB, Concepts Statement 2). 
Timeliness itself will enhance the usefulness of the information. There are many ways to define 
timeliness. Commonly known that timeliness is the reporting delay from the company’s accounting 
year end to the date of the audit report completed (Chambers and Penman, 1984). Audit report lag 
would lead the shareholders and potential shareholders to postpone their transaction on shares (Ng and 
Tai, 1994). This in turn, would provide negative ef
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Bursa Malaysia1 has demanded for timely financial reporting through the provision of Chapter 
2 and Chapter 9 of the Listing Requirements (2009), Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad. Bursa 
Malaysia listing requirement under chapter 9.23 (a) provides that a public listed companies must 
submit its annual report to Bursa Malaysia within six months after the company’s year end. To prevent 
companies from late submission of their audited financial reports, Bursa Malaysia in consultation with 
Securities Commission has imposed penalty to public listed companies for failure to disclose the 
material facts such as the annual report within the time frame. However, despite the penalty being 
imposed, there are companies that could not meet the submission deadline. This current scenario as 
reported in Bursa Malaysia website 2010 (www.bursamalaysia.com). 
Many professional and regulatory bodies have taken various actions to identify the factors that 
hinder companies in delaying the submission of financial reports. Bursa Malaysia highlighted that 
corporate governance mechanisms which is audit committee would play a significant role in the 
company to ensure that the objective of Bursa Malaysia on timely reporting can be achieved. The 
amended Bursa Malaysia Listing requirement in 2009 provides that the members of audit committee 
must not be less than 3 persons. All members of the audit committee must be non-executive directors, 
with a majority of them being independent directors and at least one member is a member of the 
Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA). If the member of the audit committee is not a member of 
MIA, the member must have at least three years of working experience. 
Malaysian Government has recommended Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 
2000) which was later revised in 2007. The revised code recommends that member of audit committee 
to comprise of fully non-executive directors, be able to read, analyse and interpret financial statements. 
This is to ensure that they would be able to effectively discharge their functions. Since audit committee 
has a close working relationship with external auditors, the audit committee would able to assist the 
level of audit coverage and assurance. This could be done by employing knowledgeable members in 
the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2003), thus, would improve timeliness and reduce audit report lag. 
Past studies that have examined the determinants of audit report lag among companies focused 
only on company’s specific variables such as company size, (Al-Ajmi, 2008), profitability (Ahmad and 
Kamarudin, 2003), year end (Ahmed, 2003); leverage (Owusu-Ansah and Leventis, 2006), industry 
type (Jaggi and Tsui, 1999), audit opinion (Ng and Tai, 1994), and type of auditor (Afify, 2009). 
However, these studies did not examine corporate governance mechanisms in relation to audit report 
lag. 
Afify (2009) and Tauringana (2008) examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on audit report lag. Both studies were conducted in a non-Malaysian setting. Within the Malaysian 
context, studies that have examined the issue of timeliness using firm’s specific variable include those 
by Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) and Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008). These two studies did not 
examine the issue of timeliness in relation to corporate governance mechanism. The current study 
extends the corporate governance literature by examining the issue of timeliness of annual reports in 
the Malaysian market by incorporating corporate governance, firm’s specific variables in relation to 
audit report lag. 
The aim of the current study is to examine whether the existence of audit committee could 
assist in reducing audit report lag. Such examination is important since the audit literature has 
identified the role of audit committee in reviewing the financial statement. This study aims to answer 
the following research question: “Could audit committee play an important role in effectively 
monitoring the timeliness of audit report? 
This study contributes to the corporate governance and audit literature by examining 
association of corporate governance; audit committee and the audit report lag. The findings of the 
study would have policy implications for MCCG. It provides supporting evidence on whether the 
development of corporate governance could significantly increase the timeliness of annual reports 
among companies in Malaysia. This study could assist Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 
                                                 
1
 Bursa Malaysia was previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
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(MICG) to provide best practice in order to enhance corporate governance mechanisms. The findings 
could also assist external auditors in evaluating the effectiveness of the audit committee in their audit 
planning. Such assistance would assist the external auditors in identifying the best time to be allocated 
for their audit engagements in terms of effort such as whether to reduce or increase effort and the 
amount of fees to be charged. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, it discusses on literature review and 
hypotheses development. Next, it describes on research design to conduct the study. It further provides 




2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Within the corporate governance mechanisms, audit committee plays an important role in the 
monitoring process as well as its reporting role in companies. These members would reduce auditors’ 
task complexity and increase timeliness. Therefore, arguably, audit committee would be able to reduce 
audit report lag. This is because the appointment of audit committee are in line with the agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) where agents act on behalf of principles in ensuring the company is 
performing well and provides quality annual reporting. 
The following sections develop three hypotheses to meet the objectives of the study which are 
related to the characteristics of audit committee. 
 
2.1. Audit Committee Independence 
According to the agency theory, the independent members in audit committee could help the principals 
to monitor the agents’ activities and reduce benefits from withholding information. This is because 
audit committee with more independent directors is considered as being a more reliable group other 
than board of directors in monitoring the company. The effective role provides by audit committee 
would be appropriate to represent the rights and privileges for all stakeholders. 
An independent audit committee enhances the effectiveness of monitoring function since it 
serves as a reinforcing agent to the independence of internal and external auditors in a company. 
Menon and Williams (1994) posits that an audit committee must comprise entirely of independent 
directors in order to be more effective. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit committees reduce 
the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. Carcello et al. (2000) found that 
audit committee independence have positive significant relationship with audit fees. This provides 
evidence that independence of the audit committee would lead to higher quality of financial report. 
Further, Ismail et al. (2008) found that the independence of audit committee would not 
influence the quality reporting of the companies. They argue that this is due to the companies only 
fulfilling the requirements, rather than the impact of the requirements. In contrast, Ali Shah et al. 
(2009) found that companies in Pakistan are having good corporate governance through having 
independence of audit committee. 
Bursa Malaysia Listing requirements (2009) and MCCG (2007) have highlighted that the audit 
committee might institute stronger internal control and good monitoring of financial reporting process 
in a company. The strong internal control managed by audit committee would lead to auditors reducing 
their work on the company’s accounts because of their reliance on the internal control of the company. 
This would subsequently lead to the decrease in audit delay. Therefore, the first hypothesis is 
developed. 




2.2. Audit Committee Diligence 
Ismail et al. (2008), measure audit committee diligence based on actual number of audit committee 
meetings held in a year. Audit committee meetings are considered as an important tool in ensuring 
audit committee members are fulfilling their responsibilities towards the company. Audit committee 
must carry out activities effectively through increased frequency of meetings in order to maintain its 
control functions (Bedard et al. 2004). Abbott et al. (2000) in their examination found that audit 
committee that meets at least twice annually is subjected to less exposure of sanction by the authorities. 
This is because regular meetings conducted would indicate that the audit committee discharges their 
duties in a well manner as an agent in the company. They also noted that audit committee that is 
wholly independent is also active by way of having meetings. 
Dechow et al. (1996) argue that audit committee is an integral part of a company that 
emphasises high level monitoring. Moreover, the monitoring function would be more effective in terms 
of financial reporting. American Bar Association posits that an audit committee which holds less than 2 
meetings annually is considered not committed to their duties. This indicates that the audit committee 
is unable to contribute to the internal control in that situation. Auditors who really monitor the internal 
control function of the company would reduce their works. However, Ismail et al. (2008) found that 
frequency of audit committee meeting could not influence the quality reporting of the companies. They 
argue that this is due to the companies only fulfilling the requirements, rather than the impact of the 
requirements. 
Razman and Iskandar (2004) found Malaysian companies that have good reporting meet more 
frequent than poor reporting companies. This is because, during the meeting, they can monitor the 
management activities. Of consequence, this will lead to the decrease time taken on auditing by the 
auditors and reduce the reporting lag. Therefore, following hypothesis is developed. 
H2: There is negative relationship between audit committee diligence and audit report lag. 
 
2.3. Audit Committee Expertise 
Audit committee expertise is important in order to deal effectively with external auditors. This is 
because audit committee typically acts as the mediator between the management and the auditors. 
DeZoort et al. (2003) note that audit committee members with experience in financial reporting and 
auditing especially those who are CPAs would understand auditors’ tasks and responsibilities. They 
would become more supportive of the auditors compared to audit committee members who do not have 
similar experience. Audit committee members who are experts are more ‘friendly’ with the auditors, 
comprehensible, logical and coherent when they are discussing with the auditors regarding the 
financial reporting of the company. 
Audit committee with more expertise would be more concerned about the financial reporting 
quality of the company. DeZoort (1998) contends that an audit committee with more internal control 
experience makes decisions or judgments similar to auditors compared to those audit committee 
members who are without experience. This reflects that experience in the accounting, internal control 
or auditing is fundamental to enable the audit committee to understand and cater on the problematic 
issue on the financial reporting system of the company. They would also realise the benefits of 
producing financial statement on time at the market. 
It is also identified that audit committee with financial expertise are going to facilitate each 
other. As discussed in resource based theory, the resources and capabilities that audit committee posses 
with financial expertise may assist in improving the firm performance. 
Listed companies in Malaysia that have financial literate members of audit committee would 
have ability to end up with good financial report (Razman and Iskandar, 2004). This is because audit 
committee who has knowledge in accounting and auditing is able to demonstrate their ability in 
monitoring of internal control and reporting. Strong internal control also would lead the auditors in 
 54 
reducing their work because of their reliance on the credibility of the internal control. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 




3.  Research Design 
Sample covered in this study are among 288 companies listed at Bursa Malaysia for three years from 
2007 to 2009. The samples are chosen randomly from 806 of the population. 
 
Table 1: Total number of companies and sample based on industry 
 
Industry Population Sample of companies Percent 
Construction 49 19 7 
Consumer 139 53 18 
Hotel 5 2 1 
Industrial 265 88 30 
Infrastructure 7 3 1 
Property 88 31 11 
Plantation 43 16 6 
Technology 29 12 4 
Trading & services 181 64 22 
TOTAL 806 288 100 
 
The companies listed at Bursa Malaysia are selected for this study because they are governed 
by the rules and regulations imposed by MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. The 
companies selected include consumer, industrial products, trading and services, construction, 
infrastructure, hotel, property, technology and plantation. Table 1 provides the number of companies 
selected from each of the sector. 
There are seven operational variables which comprise of one dependent variable, three 
independent variables and three control variables as describe in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Variables Measurements 
 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent    
ARL Audit report lag Represents the number of days elapsing between the end of the fiscal 
year of the company to the completion of the audit for the current year 
for each individual firm (the audit report date) 
Independent   




AC meeting Number of audit committee meeting 
ACEXP 
 (AC experience) 
AC expertise No of audit committee member with background experience in financial 
reporting (such as MIA,MICPA) to the total of audit committee 
members. 
Control   
SIZE Company size Natural log of year end total assets 
AUDIT TYPE Type of audit firm Dummy variable, ‘1’ if auditor is one of the former Big-4 audit firms, ‘0’ 
otherwise 





4.  Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistic 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Report Lag (N= 288) 
 
Year N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
2007 ARL 288 40.00 184.00 103.14 110.50 
2008 ARL 288 40.00 146.00 103.42 111.00 
2009 ARL 288 36.00 136.00 102.46 110.00 
2007- 2009 ARL 864 36.00 184.00 103.00 111.00 
Notes: ARL = number of days between the end of the fiscal year to the date of completion of audit 
 
As shown in Table 3, the mean score of audit report lag for the pooled sample is 103 days with 
a maximum and minimum days of 184 and 36 respectively. This indicates that on average, the 
companies took 103 days to complete their audit report. Using the pooled sample from period from 
period 2007 to 2009, the results indicate that the companies did comply with Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements and the Companies act where they submit their report within six months except for one 
company which took 184 days to submit the report. It shows that companies are improving over the 
years on the number of days taken to complete the annual reports. The results of this study are 
somewhat similar to Afify (2009) that found the maximum and mean score number of days to complete 
the annual report was 115 days and 67 days respectively. The results indicate that the number of days 
that the companies took to complete the audit report has reduced from 2007-2009 by 48 days. 
Results on previous study show relative difference with the current study. Che-Ahmad and 
Abidin (2008) found that 442 days while Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) reveal 273 days on the 
maximum of days to complete the annual report. 
 
Table 4: Number of companies and audit report lag for 2007 – 2009 
 








Year / percentage 2007 Percent 2008 Percent 2009 Percent 
1 month (30 days) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2 months (60days) 22 7.64 20 6.94 25 8.68 
3 months (90days) 42 14.58 41 14.24 41 14.24 
4 months (120days) 198 68.75 211 73.26 208 72.22 
5 months (150days) 25 8.68 16 5.56 14 4.86 
6 months (180days) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
More than 180days 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 288 100 288 100 288 100 
 
Table 4 shows that for the three year period, no company has completed and submitted their 
annual report within a month. The results also show that for the three year period, 41 to 42 companies 
have completed and submitted their annual report within 3 months. None of the companies have 
submitted their audit reports exceeding 6 months except for one company which managed to submit 
their audited report only after 184 days in year 2007. 
The results in Table 4 shows that most companies reports way ahead the date stipulated by 
Chapter 9 (9.23a) of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement that the annual report shall be issued and 
submitted within a period not exceeding 6 months from the financial year end of the company. Such 
results indicated that the companies are concerned and realised that audited reports are useful for users’ 
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decision-making. The results support the notion that excessive delay in publishing financial statements 
would increase uncertainty in relation to investment decisions (Ashton et al. 1987; Ahmad and 
Kamarudin, 2003). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistic for Audit Committee Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Independent Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
ACIND 864 0.60 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.18 
ACDIL 864 1.00 12.00 4.84 5.00 1.67 
ACEXP 864 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.33 0.19 
Control variable       
SIZE TOTASSET (RM BILLION) 864 9 -3 36.64 0.79 0.24 2.86 
TYPEAUD 864 0 1 0.58 0.00 0.49 
PROFITABILITY 864 -1.88 11.059 0.03 0.03 0.40 
Notes: 
ACINDP = percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members 
ACDIL = number of audit committee meeting 
ACEXP = no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting 
TOTASSET = total assets that the companies have at the end of the financial year. 
TYPEAUD = ‘1’ if audited by Big-4, ‘0’ if otherwise 
PROFITABILITY = net income divided with total assets 
 
Table 5 presents the characteristics of the audit committee among the listed companies. The 
results show that audit committee independence (ACIND) has a mean score 93 percent. The results 
also show that the listed companies minimum score of 60 percent of their audit committee member 
being represented by independent directors. The results indicate that the companies comply with the 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirement (2009) which requires a company to have majority of the audit 
committee members being independent directors. Although the requirement of Bursa Malaysia on the 
number of independent directors in a board of directors is different from MCCG’s (2007) requirement, 
the requirement of Bursa Malaysia listing requirement prevails MCCG’s requirements2. 
Table 5 also presents the results on the number of meetings held by the audit committee. The 
results show that almost all audit committee in the listed companies discharge their duties appropriately 
in which on average 5 meetings were being held. The highest number of meeting held by the audit 
committee during the three year period was 12 times. MCCG (2007) provides that companies should 
have their audit committee meeting at least 4 times a year. 
Table 5 also shows the mean score of audit committee expertise (ACEXP) as 0.4 (40 percent). 
Such results indicate that most audit committee in the listed companies have audit committee members 
with experience in financial reporting. Only 24 of the companies (2.78 percent) formed their audit 
committee with members not having accounting qualification. The later results did not comply with 
requirements of Bursa Malaysia listing requirements and MCCG that states at least one member of the 
audit committee must fulfill the financial expertise requisite. In fact, two companies for the three year 
period have yet to comply with the requirement to have one of the audit committee members’ with 
financial expertise. 
 
4.2. Correlation Matrix Analysis 
Table 6 shows a non-significant value (0.333) which is more than 0.05, indicating data normality. 
Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk tests, this study concludes that audit report lag is 
normally distributed. 
 
                                                 
2
 MCCG (2007) provides that, all members of the audit committee should be non-executive directors. 
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Table 6: Normality Test for Audit Report Lag 
 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
NARL 0.034 864 0.021 0.998 864 0.333 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Table 7 shows no correlation problem among the variables since the value is less than 0.5. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates all variables have a value below two which is within the 
acceptable range of 10. 
 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix Table 
 
 ARL ACDIL ACIND ACEXP Log_Asset TYPEAUD ROA 
ARL 1       
ACDIL 0.096** 1      
ACIND -0.068* 0.030 1     
ACEXP -0.019 0.022 0.013 1    
LOG_ASSET -0.170** 0.093** 0.078* -0.003 1   
TYPE AUD -0.170** -0.088** 0.010 -0.021 0.195** 1  
ROA -0.076* 0.033 0.029 -0.032 -0.021 0.006 1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Notes: 
ACINDP = percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members 
ACDIL = number of audit committee meeting 
ACEXP = no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting 
LOG_ASSET = natural log of total assets (in billions of ringgit Malaysia) 
TYPEAUD = ‘1’ if audited by Big-4, ‘0’ if otherwise 
ROA = net income divided with total assets 
 
4.3. Fixed Panel Regression 
This section presents the results of the fixed panel regression using Eviews. The panel data analysis is 
an increasingly popular form of longitudinal data analysis among social and behavioral science 
researchers (Hsiao, 2003). A panel is a cross-section or group of people who are surveyed periodically 
over a given time period. In this study, the group is the listed companies selected and the time is the 
duration of the data collected, which is the three year period of 2007 until 2009. Since the data is 
bound to be heterogeneity, the panel data technique could take such heterogeneity explicitly into 
account by allowing individual specific variables (Gujarati, 2003). Normal regression does not adjust 
firm’s specific effect which would lead to variables being omitted and mis-specified the model (Fraser 
et al. 2005). Fixed effect model could overcome such problem by adjusting the effects through firm’s 
specific intercept by capturing immeasurable firm’s specific characteristics (Fraser et al. 2005). Panel 
data provides more informative of data, variability and efficiency. Under the panel data, the model is 
generated as follows: 
ARL = β1ACINDP + β2ACMEET + β3ACEXP +β4SIZE+ β5AUDTYPE +β6PROF + ε it 
 
Table 8: Fixed Panel Regression Result 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
ACIND -0.021706 0.001* 
ACDIL -0.009835 0.899 
ACEXP -0.040084 0.001* 
LOG_ASSET -0.129782 0.012* 
ROA -0.002146 0.264 
TYPEAUD 0.002535 0.294 
C 5.786734 0.000 
N 864  
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Table 8: Fixed Panel Regression Result - continued 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.802562  
F-statistic 12.811  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  
Notes: 
ACINDP = percentage of non-executive directors to the total of audit committee members 
ACDIL =number of audit committee meeting 
ACEXP = no of audit committee member with background experience in financial reporting 
LOG_ASSET  = natural log of total assets (in billions of ringgit Malaysia) 
TYPEAUD = ‘1’ if audited by Big-4, ‘0’ if otherwise 
ROA = net income divided with total assets 
Adjusted R2  = adjusted R2 coefficient determination 
F stat = indicate how much variation is explained by the regression equation. 
*significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8 shows that the audit committee independence (ACINDP) and audit committee expertise 
(ACEXP) are significant at 1% level. Thus, accepting hypotheses one and three respectively. On the 
other hand, the results show that there is no relationship between audit committee diligence and audit 
report lag. Therefore, hypothesis two is rejected. 
The results indicate that audit committee independence and audit committee expertise may 
reduce on audit report lag but audit committee diligence could not influence audit report lag. Carcello 
et al. (2000) found that audit committee independence and audit committee expertise have significant 
relationship with audit fee while audit committee diligence did not provide any relationship on audit 
fees. 
The results in this study shows significant relationship between audit independence and audit 
report lag which is similar to Klein (2002) that found that more independent audit committee members 
would effectively influence financial reporting quality. The results of this study support the view that 
audit committee with a simple majority of independent audit committee members are more likely to 
fulfill its duties effectively compared to an audit committee members that have no independent audit 
committee members. This is consistent with agency theory where independent members in an audit 
committee could assist principals to monitor the agents’ activities and reduce benefits from 
withholding information. They would have had provided more effective roles in monitoring the 
companies. 
Further, the number of financial experts on audit committee will reduce incident of fraud 
(Farber, 2005). A member with financial expertise demonstrate a high level of financial reporting 
knowledge and thus expected to lead the committee, identify and ask knowledgeable questions that 
challenge management and external auditor (He et al. 2009). 
In practice, it is a general belief that more meeting and discussion of the committee would 
improve the performance of the company. However, similar to the study done by Uzun et al. (2004), 
the results in this study show that the number of audit committee meeting held is not significantly 
associated with audit report lag. More frequent meeting that the company has does not necessarily 
provide better achievement to the companies. Thus, the company needs to ensure audit committee 
member raised and resolved issues with management during the meeting, and as a result improve the 
quality of reporting. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The results of this study show that audit committee characteristics: audit committee independence and 
audit committee expertise contribute as important factors that affect audit report lag of the companies. 
Such results correspond to the resource based theory where those characteristics of audit committee as 
the resources and capabilities that may improve companies’ performance as well as on the corporate 
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reporting. These two characteristics represent the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement that require audit 
committee compose of not fewer than 3 members with majority of them being independent directors 
and requires at least one member of the audit committee to have financial expertise requisite. Audit 
committees with those characteristics could assist the companies to be timely in their annual reporting. 
Finally, this study could not find significant link between audit committee meeting to audit 
report lag. This study suggests that audit committee could prioritise important things that need to be 
resolved during the meeting in order to improve the performance of the company as well as in assuring 
audit report lag. 
This study is not without limitations. This study does not include other factors such as 
government policy or political issue that also might affect audit report lag. McGee (2007) noted that 
the influence of timeliness might be attributed by culture, political and economic system of the 
country. Secondly, covering a bigger sample would provide greater generalization on the Malaysian 
listed companies on audit report lag and corporate governance characteristics. Finally, this study only 
covers a three year period from 2007 until 2009. A longer period such as ten year period data would be 
more interesting as it can show the trend on audit report lag. For future research avenues, a possibility 
is to examine other corporate governance mechanisms; characteristics of board of directors in assuring 
audit report lag. Future research can also examine which parties are liable for the delay of annual 
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